should be noted, however, that even though these three types of active externalism are supposed to be distinct and can be motivated on the basis of independent argumentative lines, they are not incompatible with each other; there is in fact significant overlap between them. Likewise within the literature concerning the debate over active externalism, there is no consensus regarding how the view is supposed to be contrasted with the less provocative hypothesis of embedded cognition, according to which cognition may rely heavily on the agent's surrounding environment, but is clearly restricted within one's organismic boundaries. This unfortunate lack of clear theoretical distinctions is unsurprisingly inherited by the nascent (though burgeoning) literature at the intersection of epistemology and externalist philosophy of mind. Accordingly, even though there have been a few attempts to provide a topography of the relevant theoretical landscape so as to clarify what are the possible ways in which (for instance) knowledge and epistemic justification can be conceived of as extended or distributed, the present entry should be considered as a first attempt to categorize the existing and quickly growing literature in as an informative way as possible so as to facilitate future research on the topic. To this end, existing literature has been organised in the following categories: (1) 'General overviews' of the literature on the intersection of philosophy of mind and epistemology; (2) 'Textbooks' dedicated to the topic, broadly construed (3) 'Anthologies' dedicated to the topic; (4) 'Embedded cognition and epistemology' (5) 'Extended Cognition and Epistemology' (6) 'Extended Mind and Epistemology' (7) 'Distributed Cognition and Epistemology' (8), 'Collaborative Knowledge and Scientific Knowledge'; and finally, (9) 'Related Literature', which contains miscellaneous literature that is expected to have an important input in future related literature.
General Overviews
While most of the literature at the intersection of epistemology and active externalism explores specific topics of connection between these two areas, there are two survey-style pieces which provide a wider perspective on the growing body of work relating epistemology to active externalism. Palermos & Pritchard (2013) is one such treatment, which explores (in particular) some of the more general themes at the fore of work connecting active externalism and social epistemology. The most comprehensive and substantial survey piece to date is Carter et al. (2014) , which is a 40-plus page, state-of-the-art overview of the terrain. In addition, building on some of the foreground laid out in Carter et al., (Carter & Palermos, forthcominga) explore in greater details the compatibility of epistemic internalism and content externalism, and (Carter & Palermos, forthcomingb) , provides a detailed exploration of the compatibility between epistemic internalism and active externalism. Carter, J.A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S.O., Pritchard, D. (2014) Examines two prominent arguments against the compatibility of epistemic internalism and content externalism and argues that both arguments fail by equivocating on the notion of epistemic justification involved in their premises; this can become particularly obvious once the independently motivated distinction between subjective and objective justification is introduced. Argues that, despite initial intuitions to the contrary, active externalism is compatible to epistemic internalism, and that only when the latter is explicitly paired to epistemic individualism does genuine incompatibility arise.
Textbooks
There are, to date, no textbooks proper on this relatively new topic. There are, however, several monographs that engage exclusively with philosophical issues integral to applications of active externalism to epistemology. Clark (2008) draws from recent interdisciplinary work to depict some coalitions of biological and non-biological resources as the extended cognitive circuitry of individual minds. In doing so, this monograph fleshes out, in more sophistication, the kind of proposal Clark & Chalmers proposed in their classic paper defending an extended mind. Menary (2007) is a monograph that offers a systematised argument for the view that, in short, 'internal' and 'external' aspects of cognition are integrated into a whole. Argues for a 'hybrid' conception of cognition, on which internal and external processes and vehicles complement one another in the completion of cognitive tasks.
Anthologies
There are already five collections of papers that specifically concern the epistemological connections of (various forms of) active externalism. The earliest such collection of papers is a 2012 special issue of Philosophical Explorations, (Clark et al. 2012) , entitled 'Extended Cognition and Epistemology'. While this collection focuses on the epistemological ramifications of specifically extended cognition, the 2014 Philosophical Issues special issue on Extended Knowledge (Carter et al. 2014) , as well as the forthcoming 2015 American Philosophical Quarterly special issue Varieties of Externalism: Epistemic, Content, Vehicle (Carter et al. 2015) , feature papers that connect epistemological issues with (along with extended cognition), embedded cognition, distributed cognition and the extended mind. Along with these special journal issues, there is also an edited volume featuring original contributions on extended knowledge, forthcoming in 2015 from Oxford University Press. The 2015 volume, Extended Epistemology, features a range of papers that engage with the issue of how knowledge might be conceived of as extended. The first collection of papers connecting any variety of active externalism to epistemology; offers papers both optimistic and pessimistic about the epistemological ramifications of extended cognitive processes. Features six papers connecting varieties of externalism in epistemology and the philosophy of mind.
Embedded Cognition and Knowledge
As noted in the introduction, within the literature regarding the debate over active externalism, there is little consensus as to how the view should be contrasted with the less provocative hypothesis of embedded cognition, and this is occasionally reflected within the literature at the intersection of epistemology and philosophy of mind. Indicatively, the exchange between Vaesen 2011, Vaesen 2013 and Kelp 2013a and Kelp 2013b concerns the former's attempt to challenge virtue reliabilism on the basis of what he calls 'mundane cases of extended cognition' and the latter's attempt to defend virtue reliabilism against the relevant arguments, but it should be made clear that the said 'mundane cases of extended cognition' are perhaps best characterised as cases of embedded cognition. Independently of the debate between Vaesen and Kelp, Gerken 2014 attempts to elucidate this crucial distinction with an eye specifically on epistemology.
Gerken, M. (2014)
. 'Outsourced Cognition', Philosophical Issues, 24, .
Argues that 'outsourced cognition' (a form of embedded cognition) should be prefered over extended cognition; such a view, according to Gerken, is well placed to elucidate several problems concerning what may be considered an extended epistemology of testimony. Vaesen's response to Kelp's (2011) defense of virtue reliabilism against the relevant arguments.
Extended Cognition and Epistemology
Thus far, the literature on the epistemological ramifications of active externalism has been framed primarily in terms of the extended cognition thesis on the basis of two general approaches. The first general approach focuses on the most obvious interface between active externalism and mainstream epistemology, which is to draw connections between extended cognitive processes and the kinds of cognitive abilities adverted to by virtue epistemologists. The second general approach is less systematic but attempts to introduce the idea of cognitive extension within mainstream epistemology in a multitude of new and interesting ways that do not make any specific epistemological commitments.
Extended Cognition and Virtue Epistemology
The first such paper to appear is Pritchard (2010), which connects the conditions that must be satisfied for a cognitive processes to count as a knowledgegenerative cognitive ability, with the conditions that must be satisfied for an external artifact to be integrated into a cognitive process one employs, as per the hypothesis of extended cognition. Palermos (2011, 2014, forthcoming) develops this programme further, and focuses on cognitive integration conditions, both from the perspective of virtue reliabilism within externalist epistemology and the perspective of extended cognition within externalist philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Jarvis (2014), likewise addresses cognitive integration by drawing attention to how a subject's environment can play epistemic roles that are indicative of cognitive roles. Clark has recently highlighted some possible shortcomings in the existing approaches, which, he suggests, can be overcome by invoking considerations related to predictive coding. In addition, Menary (2012) argues that epistemic cognitive characters extend not via external artifacts but rather via publicly acquired practices of creating and manipulating information and Hetherington (2012) argues that in general, when epistemic externalism is properly understood, it can meaningfully provide for the possibility of extended knowers whose epistemic cognitive capacities are not restricted with their organismic boundaries. Synthese. 10.1007/s11229-015-0719-z Argues that current attempts to reconcile virtue epistemology with the hypothesis of extended cognition seem to face certain problems that might be satisfactorily resolved by introducing consideration pertaining to predictive coding. Argues that virtue reliabilism and the extended cognition hypothesis share some intriguing similarities that can provide for a principled account of the way in which knowledge-conducive cognitive characters may extend beyond natural cognitive capacities by incorporating epistemic artifacts. ', Synthese, 191(8), 1931 ', Synthese, 191(8), -1951 Combines elements of virtue reliabilism with extended cognition to argue that so long as the agent's belief-forming process has been integrated in his cognitive character, the agent can be justified in holding the resulting beliefs merely by lacking any undefeated psychological defeaters. Argues that epistemic cognitive characters extend not on the basis of the integration of epistemic artifacts, such as notebooks, but on the basis of acquired practices of creating and manipulating information that is stored in a publicly accessible environment.
Clark, A. (forthcoming)
. What Extended Me Knows.
Palermos, S. O. (2014). 'Knowledge and Cognitive Integration

Pritchard, D. (2010). 'Cognitive Ability and the Extended Cognition Thesis', Synthese 175(1): 133-151.
Argues that the conception of cognitive ability that is plausibly required for knowledge can be rendered consistent with the extended cognition thesis.
Extended Cognition and General Mainstream Epistemology
One natural strand of research that has emerged from interfacing extended cognition with mainstream thinking about epistemology, concerns new puzzles--puzzles (for traditional epistemology) that seem to materialise only once beliefforming processes are conceived as extended. Carter (2013) Argues that a Deweyan epistemological framework better accommodates extended cognition than does the principal machinery used by mainstream analytic epistemology.
Extended Mind and Epistemology
Literature connecting the extended mind thesis to epistemology has largely clustered around two guiding themes: (i) the potential explosion of knowledge that seems like a prima facie epistemological upshot of the extended mind thesis; and (ii) ways that EMT stands to challenge orthodox ways of thinking about epistemic states and epistemic agents. Bjerring & Pedersen (2014 ), Lynch (2014 and Ludwig (forthcoming) have engaged with the knowledge explosion issue. The latter, more general, issue has been pursued in the papers Smithies (2015), Toon (2014 ), Wifkorss (2014 and DeCruz & deSmedt (2013) . Smithies (2015) argues that EMT is incompatible with access internalism. Wikforss (2014) by contrast, argues that the kind of extended knowledge that would be motivated by EMT would be compatible with epistemic internalism as well as well as with varieties of epistemic externalism with which it would appear to fit more naturally. Toon (2014) Argues that the extended mind thesis is incompatible with access internalism, and on this basis, makes an epistemological case against the extended mind thesis. ', Philosophical Issues, 24, [409] [410] [411] [412] [413] [414] [415] [416] [417] [418] [419] [420] [421] [422] [423] [424] [425] Argues that the extended mind thesis offers a way to make sense of realists' talk of instruments as extensions to the senses and that it provides the realist with a new argument against the constructive empiricist view of instruments. Philosophical Issues, 24, Appeals to the connection relationship between the extended mind and extended knowers to argue that extended knowledge does not presuppose epistemic externalism, nor does it presuppose virtue epistemology. edge'. Philosophical Psychology. DOI: 10.1080 /09515089.2013 Argues that that the extended mind thesis leads to an explosion of knowledge that is caused by online resources such as Wikipedia and Google, which, on externalist accounts of cognition, must be conceived of as extended cognitive processes.
Toon, A. (2014). 'Empiricism for Cyborgs
Wikforss, Å. (2014). 'Extended Belief and Extended Knowledge',
Ludwig, D. (forthcoming). 'Extended Cognition and the Explosion of Knowl
De Cruz, H. & De Smedt, J. (2013) . 'Mathematical Symbols as Epistemic Actions. Argues, on the basis of the extended mind thesis, that mathematical symbols allow us to offload mathematical operations to the external environment and that mathematical symbols are constitutive of the mathematical concepts themselves.
Distributed Cognition and Epistemology
Although still in its infancy, the intersection of mainstream epistemology and the hypothesis of distributed cognition has already gained some attention. Michaelian (2014) has put forward a version of distributed reliabilism and Green (2014) argues for an extended credit theory of knowledge in order to accommodate knowledge produced on the basis of distributed cognition Argues for an extended credit theory of knowledge in order to accommodate knowledge produced on the basis of distributed cognition.
Collaborative Knowledge and Scientific Knowledge
Even though not directly related to mainstream epistemology (save Palermos forthcoming), there is an impressive number of publications dealing with the interesting question of whether much of scientific knowledge should be understood in terms of distributed cognition. For example, both Nersessian (2006) and Thagaard (1993 Thagaard ( , 1994 argue that social approaches to science can be most fruitfully spelled out in terms of distributed cognition, and Giere (2007) concurs with such an approach, though warns that this should not be further taken to imply the existence of collective cognitive states such a distributed cognitive knowing. Solomon (1994) suggests that scientific rationality (with respect to theory choice) should be better understood as having its origins not in the individuals scientists but in the scientists' epistemic community, and Kerr & Gelfert (2014) argue that the concept of scientific evidence can be better understood in terms of the idea of 'extendedness'. Finally, in a more mainstream epistemological tone, de Ridder (2014) argues that scientific knowledge can count as collective knowledge when satisfaction of the justification condition requires the presence of a collective entity. Kerr, E. & Gelfert, A. (2014) . 'The "Extendedness" of Scientific Evidence ', Philosophical Issues, 24, Argues that when the idea of 'extendedness' is applied to a core concept in epistemology and the philosophy of science -namely, scientific evidence -things appear to be on a much surer footing. Argues for a combined approach to philosophy of science that focuses on both social and cognitive factors, suggesting that there may not be a clear distinction between the two.
Related Literature
Finally, there is a wealth of literature that-even though it is not directly related to active externalism in any of the three forms identified in the introductory section-nonetheless raises interesting and important issues with respect to the possible ways in which knowledge or its subparts may stretch beyond organismic cognitive capacities or even shared by groups of individuals. Tuomela (2004) and Gilbert (2007) , for example, have pioneered an approach to collective epistemology in terms of collective intentions and beliefs. In a similar spirit, O'Madigain (2014) complements the approach by arguing for the existence of group concepts and Tollefsen (2006) explores whether collective intentions can solve the problem of groupthink, while Carter (2014) studies peer-disagreement between groups and defends a (non-summativist) group conception of conciliationism. In addition to this 'collective intentions' approach to social epistemology, Goldberg (2014) has argued for the social nature of epistemic entitlement at least in the epistemology of testimony and Bird (2010) has argued that entire scientific communitites may be the subjects of knowledge. Lackey (2014) , however, has contested Bird's view by proposing that we should instead take such entities to be merely in a position to know. Argues that there is a social or collective sense of scientific knowledge that does not supervene on what individuals know or even intend but which is instead motivated on the basis of a strong analogy between the functional role of individual and social knowing.
Explores whether dissent can be achieved within groups, despite the likelihood of the epistemic defect of groupthink, and proposes a possible by solution on the basis of the approach of collective intentionality. Tuomela, R. (2004) . 'Group Knowledge Analyzed', Episteme, 1 (2): 109-127.
Focuses on collective mental (belief) states, in order to argue for group knowledge much in the sense of traditional epistemology.
